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Abstract 
Egypt has had an influential role in the Arab and Muslim world. After the 25 January uprising (2011), the focus has been on the 
democratic transition process in this country, which has faced a lot of obstacles that make it very difficult, slow and prone to failure. 
These obstacles related to internal and external factors. The performance of Muslim Brotherhood, the opposition, the media, the 
counter-revolution and the deep state is very crucial in this transition stage. As well, the regional and international position from 
the elected authority has an effective role, particularly on the Egyptian economy. 
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1. Introduction 
Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) became the ruling party in Egypt after the 25 January uprising. The Egyptian 
political scene showed that FJP is the only party that has the ability to lead Egypt in this stage. After dismantling the 
former ruling party, the National Democratic Party (NDP) and many new parties have realized they are not effective 
and popular in the Egyptian streets based on the parliamentary elections unlike the FJP, the political arm of Muslim 
Brotherhood (MB), who has the largest number of members, and a considerable number of leaders, figure, scholars, 
professors and experts. President Muhammad Mursi, for example, is an expert in engineering, and Sa‘d al-Katatni, the 
FJP chairman is a professor. This made them more confident that they would be able to lead the post- 2011 uprising 
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era, even they were alone. They believed that their team of experts will lead the renaissance of Egypt. 
In short time, they spread throughout Egypt. With the help and support of MB, the FJP managed to open divisions 
in every district and city. They managed to conduct the internal elections all over the country and form a democratic 
party with elected leadership and institutions. Their organized mentality that had inherited from the parent movement 
(MB) helped them to form accurate and highly built party. They wrote and published the regulations, the election 
programs and the platform of the party in less than one year; while some of other political parties were still trying to 
organize themselves. They have published a strategic plan to rebuild Egypt and transform it to be a modern and 
developed country. Their project of renaissance clearly outlines the short and long terms plans, the comprehensive 
vision as well as the goals. On the other side, the opposition parties lack clear programs and visions. 
Post- 2011 uprising Egypt needs a confident, strong and organized ruling party which is able to face threats and 
challenges fuelled by what called the deep state, the counter- revolution, the anarchy, lack of security, and the gangs.  
It also needs the support of the honest and loyal Egyptian people. For example, many problems have come to the 
surface directly after the uprising since Mursi was elected as a President of Egypt. The need for a strong ruling party 
became more necessary when the parties failed to make a national coalition. The lack of solidarity between the 
revolutionary parties resulted in the one-ruling party system again. The national responsibility and the response to the 
will of the people who elected the FJP party and his candidate Mursi forced FJP to move onward and defend the 
people interests. 
2. Obstacles in the Road of Change 
The path to the modern democratic state in Egypt is crowded with obstacles. The high ambition of the 
revolutionaries who suffered a lot to get rid of the autocratic regime is not easy to be achieved. Egypt is one of the 
third world states that never has an elected civil president, or government. People of Egypt have never enjoyed their 
freedom before the uprising. Their life for many years was a compound of fear, poverty, struggle, and wars. But they 
managed to keep the hope, moderation, tolerance, joy and patience. Their life has been a special blend that can be 
seen in Egypt only. 
The special nature of the Egyptian people resulted in a civil uprising that could not get rid of all bad components 
of the former regime. The people and the leaders of the uprising and parties were very keen to have a peaceful uprising. 
The revolutionary parties did not use any violence or military means. This was considered as a triumph without heavy 
bloodshed, destruction or military confrontations, and it led to quick desired results. However, it was not able to uproot 
all the corrupted and unfriendly institutions of the previous regime. 
Few months after the uprising grave difficulties started to appear in the democratic track. Many parties from inside 
and outside Egypt started to put sticks in the wheels of the transition. They have tried to hamper the change and 
development in every aspect of life. They want to send messages to the Egyptians and the people in the Arab world 
that the ‘Arab spring’ is not a real change and has a great risk on the future of their countries. These obstacles are 
briefly discussed below. 
2.1. The Political deterioration under Mubarak 
     During Mubarak’s era (1981-2011), the Egyptians were deprived of their basic political rights. All these rights 
were violated under the coverage of the corrupted laws enacted by the ruling party (NDP) to severe their interests and 
to rule the country alone. The emergency law had been imposed all the time, accompanied with an absence of 
pluralism, political freedom and freedom of expression and protest. The opposition leaders who tried to protest against 
this unjust situation were sent to prison. Most of them and MB leaders, in particular, had been arrested for many times 
including the current president, Mursi. The presidential elections did not happen, only, in advance known results, 
referendums to renew the mandate for the president was hold many times. The parliamentary elections had been faked 
every time (Tadros, 2012). 
     This situation led to the lack of political experience, especially among the opposition. They did not have the chance 
to practice politics. They did not have the chance to found parties and play a real role in the official political life. They 
did not have the opportunity to talk freely to the media. These parties were not able to build and produce political 
leaders equipped with political skills. It is noticeable that the prominent opposition political leaders, who are leading 
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the political life now in the government and in the opposition, are among those who had the chance to develop their 
abilities in Sadat’s era. The majority acted as leaders of student movements in the 1970s when Sadat widened the 
political freedoms margin. Abd al-Mun‘im Abu al-Futuh, Hamdain Sabahi, Isam al-Aryan and many others were the 
leaders of the student’s unions in 1970s (Mubarak, 1995). 
     The 30 years of Mubarak’s era was a mass grave for political abilities and political activists. There were two 
choices for the political activists either not to participate in the political activities or to stay in prison and suffer from 
all kinds of oppression. Egypt was considered as a state of ‘political illiteracy’ in this era. People and activists were 
deprived of talking, discussion and participation in politics. Politics was open just for the NDP cadres and leaders who 
were characterized as arrogant, corrupted and opportunistic. They used to accuse the opposition leaders, especially 
MB leader of credulity, lack of knowledge and lack of political experience and skills (Al-Baz, 2007).   
     Mubarak’s regime damaged the civil and personal life of people. They suffered a lot from the security fist of the 
regime. The heavy attendance of the security agencies in people’s life made them suspect that anyone might be a 
security agent or a spy (Mukhbir). The fear from the security spies spread widely to the extent that the Egyptians have 
stated a proverb, “even the walls have ears,” (al-Hidan liha Wdan), According to Yusri Al-Faham. 
     In the internal security, Mubarak relied on two notorious security agencies: the police force and the State Security 
Investigation Service (SSI). These two security services interfered in all aspects of life. People suffered from their 
tough means used to deal them with. The violation of human rights on the hand of these agencies was regular, intensive 
and widespread. Many persons were killed in their detention centers. The most famous one was Khalid sa‘id who 
became a symbol of the 25 January uprising. The Facebook page called Kuluna Khalid Sa‘id (We are all Khalid Sa‘id) 
was the main page urging people to take part in the uprising. 
     These security services deliberately used to humiliate people. They not only arrested people out of the law, but 
they tortured them without legitimate reasons. In some cases, they sexually abused the detained people. This role 
changed the police from being in the service of people to be in the service of the regime. By time, it became the enemy 
of people. In the 25 January uprising, the revenge of the police and the state security services was among the main 
objectives of the protesters. Most of their headquarters were attacked and burned.   
     The previous regime left a heavy economical legacy. The alliance between wealth and authority separated Egypt 
into two classes. The vast majority had suffered from poverty, and the very rich minority monopolized the major 
sectors of business. Two thousand businessmen seized 24 percent of the Egypt’s national income. Most of the NDP 
leaders were from the rich class. They misused their official positions and accumulated enormous wealth, while more 
than 9 million of the Egyptians were unemployed, according to FJP election program 2011. 
     The spread of poverty gave rise to many negative social phenomena, in some cases with cultural effects. A large 
number of slums, especially in Cairo, appeared in Egypt. Millions of the Egyptian lived with inhuman conditions in 
these slums. The beggars could be seen anywhere. The thugs had strong relations with the regime. The ruling party 
had used them many times for specific missions, even in politics. The last time was in what known as the Ma‘rakat 
al-Jamal (camel battle). The worst phenomenon is ‘robbery’ which has become tradition for a wide number of people. 
As Husam Awad said; In Cairo, anyone could be a target for the thieves, in streets, buses, restaurants and elsewhere. 
The poverty forced millions of the Egyptians to work overseas. They were willing to work in every job to gain money. 
In some countries, like the Arab Gulf countries, they faced a lot of humiliation from the governments and the locals. 
After the uprising, the Egyptian people wherever they live have started to regain their dignity, freedom and glory. 
     Mubarak’s regime had corrupted all the aspects of the Egyptian life. He left a worn-out society and state. Corruption 
was a part of the government institutions and officials nature. They coexisted with it, and reached the point that the 
officials had not felt that there was any need for change. Mubarak corrupted the state institutions as well as a great 
number of people. The officials who had acted in a bad manner and those who undergone this kind of actions became 
more and more corrupted. It is a kind of Tasahur ‘desertification’, as Sharif Al-Kharashi called it. 
      Mubarak’s state was rife of bribery including the policeman in the street, the governmental institutions and the 
presidential palace. Many businessmen used to pay for Mubarak’s sons to facilitate their business. Meanwhile, the 
amount of the bribe depended on the service. After the uprising, many officials who occupied senior position faced 
charges of corruption and theft of public money (Tadros, 2012).  
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2.2. International and Regional non-Cooperation 
     Mubarak’s Egypt was a cornerstone in a regional alliance that called axis of moderation. In the Middle East, this 
axis has been supported by the west, in particular the USA. The countries of this axis participated with USA in the 
‘War on Terror.’ They had adopted tough security policies against the Islamic movements, especially those who 
declared their hostility to USA and its policies in the region. The United States depended on them in many dirty works 
that violated the basic human rights. Their prisons witnessed flagrant violation of the human right and inhuman ways 
of torture (Lynch, 2011). 
     The USA and the western countries have supported this axis because of its position from the occupying power 
‘Israel’ that recognizes its legitimacy and its right of existence on the Palestinian land. Egypt had also led the efforts 
to convince the Palestinians to hold peaceful negotiations with ‘Israel’ and abandon the army struggle. Egypt had been 
the main regional sponsor for the peace process in the Middle East. Mubarak’s Egypt had taken a hostile stance from 
the resistant movements in Palestine and Lebanon. In the 2008-2009, the Israeli War against Gaza and less than 48 
hours before the war, the Israeli foreign minister threatened the Palestinians from Cairo after a meeting with Mubarak 
and his staff. This considered as an announcement of war from Cairo backed up with full support from and cooperation 
with Egypt(Stacher, 2009). 
     The former Egyptian regime had received special economic and political support and patronage from USA and 
other western countries for its role in the war on terror and the war against the resistance in Palestine and the 
commitment to the peace process. As a result Mubarak had believed that his legitimacy did not come from the Egyptian 
people but from the foreign support, particularly USA and ‘Israel’. Therefore, he was not concerned with his nation 
interests, and his prime focus was on the satisfaction of the west and Israel. This was one of the main causes of the 25 
January uprising. 
     Despite the vital role that Mubarak had in the Middle East, the western powers, especially USA, decided to abandon 
him when they had realized that there was no hope for him to maintain his regime. The west chose to stand beside the 
popular uprising in attempt to appear that they were still faithful to the principles of liberty, dignity, human rights and 
freedom of choice. The USA and its alliances in the world had done their best to support what called the liberal and 
secular parties in Egypt, hopping that these parties would be the alternative from Mubarak’s regime. But the reality 
appeared that these parties did not have the ability, from different aspects, to lead Egypt after the uprising. The only 
party who could lead was the FJP.  
     After the FJP victory in parliamentary and the presidency elections and became the ruling party, the western 
countries felt very ambivalent towards these developments in the political scene in Egypt.  On one hand, they talked 
much about their support of the democratic transition in the ‘Arab spring’ countries. On the other hand, they are not 
willing to support the Islamic parties to take control in these countries. This is a hypocritical position on democracy 
and its principles. The western powers have tried to abort the efforts of the first Egyptian elected president, Muhammad 
Mursi, to build the democratic state. They have tried to impose their conditions on him using the Egyptian economical 
needs, as happened with the World Bank loan that Egypt tried to take to recover its economy. 
     Regionally, many regimes in Arab countries have been very afraid of the democratic change in the region because 
they are totalitarians, and have never practiced democracy. They know that people freedom means the end of their 
authorities. These regimes have never been chosen by their people. All of them are dictators, and depend on the 
security services and the external support, especially from USA, in their rule. They do not have any kind of legitimacy. 
After the spread of the ‘Arab spring’ in many countries: Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Yemen and Syria, the other Arab 
countries have started to work internally and externally to avoid the political tsunami in the region. Internally, they 
have made some pro forma reforms. The rich countries have started to improve the financial situation of the people 
by increasing the salaries, offering more jobs and so on. Externally, they have worked resolutely to abort the 
democratic transition in the countries of the Arab spring.  They have stopped any economic support for these countries. 
They have supported the opposition of the new democratic regimes. They have also launched an intensive media 
campaigns that focus on some bad phenomena accompanied the democratic transition, especially the economic 
difficulties. Through these campaigns, they have tried to frighten their own people from the change, claiming that it 
will bring the worst. They have also aimed to hinder the new democratic authorities’ efforts in building new 
democratic states. 
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     Finally, this crucial political confrontation in post- 2011 uprising Egypt might represent a regional and international 
confrontation. It is the confrontation between the ambitions of the Islamic political movements, which represent the 
will of the vast majority of the people, to establish the Islamic, democratic, independent, free and modern state that 
they have worked for it since long time, and  the foreign influence on the current governments to resist any democratic 
transition. The influence that aims to secure the interests of the foreign powers, secure the occupying power (Israel), 
and preserve the totalitarian regimes. 
2.3. The Role of the Opposition 
     Since the FJP became the ruling party in Egypt, two types of opposition have been found. The first one has come 
from the Islamic parties that some of them split from MB, and the others are not from the same Islamic school of 
thought. The second group includes the national secular and leftist parties, who are the majority of the opposition 
parties. They have founded a wide coalition called Jabhat al-Inqadh al-Watani (National Salvation Front) 
(NSF)(Masetti et al., 2013). 
     The Islamic opposition is separated into two groups. The first includes the Islamic parties: the Salafists (al-Nur 
Party) and the Jihadists (al-Bina’ wa al-Tanmiyah) who have different intellectual reference from the MB. Historically 
they do not agree with the MB method of working for Islam. They have their own scholars and interpretative method. 
They do not believe that MB is the perfect representative for Islam. Sometimes they had clashed with MB (Tammam, 
2012).  
     The different Islamic visions that the Salafists and the Jihadists have did not prevent them from cooperating with 
FJP and president Mursi. They have shown a lot of flexibility and realism. They have supported FJP and Mursi against 
the secular opposition because the common issues between them and FJP are more than the others. These parties and 
MB have the same ultimate goal, the reestablishment of the Islamic Caliphate. Therefore, they consider all the 
differences with MB are marginal. Despite this, in some issues they have opposed FJP policies such as the date of 
implementation of the Islamic law and the international relations and the relation with Israel and Iran in particular.  
     The second Islamic opposition parties are those who split from MB, such as al-Tayar al-Masri and Misr al-
Qawiyah. The leaders and cadres of these parties were from MB cadres. They have the same internal education, the 
same intellectual school and the same final goals. They disagreed with MB on organizational and political issues, such 
as the way of leadership, the political priorities after the uprising and in some cases about personal positions or 
behaviors. 
     The same background and the same ultimate goal for FJP and these parties have not played positive role in their 
relations. The relationship between them has been very tough and uncharitable. MB and FJP look to these parties as 
defected parties not as new political parties that can cooperate with them. The lack of political tolerance has appeared 
clearly in this issue. The FJP leaders, cadres and members still launch endless attack against them in different ways. 
As well, these parties have tried to take opposite political stances that promote their position as new opposite parties 
regardless of their historical background. They have taken political positions which have made them appear as a real 
defiant opposition. 
     The other major part of the opposition is the coalition of national secular and leftist parties (NSF) that consists of 
more than 35 groups; the main parties are: the Egyptian Social Democratic party, the Constitution party and the 
Egyptian Popular Current. The parties in this coalition have different political backgrounds and different visions and 
programs for the future. However, their stance from FJP as a ruling party has united them. They have a common goal; 
that is to prevent FJP from achieving its goals to establish an Islamic state in Egypt. They want to build up a secular 
state. They are afraid of the FJP program that, from their perspective, may lead to a religious state. Objective analysis 
for the historical political and intellectual background of the NSF reveals that their opposition to FJP program and 
ruling is based on combined factors: ideology, politics, fears, and desires (Masetti et al., 2013). 
         The secular opposition claim that they have modern, liberal and respectful program that deserve to rule Egypt. 
At the same time they claim that the Islamic program that FJP adopted is reactionary and non-democratic, and depends 
on rhetoric claims. In reality, from their perspective, this program failed in many Islamic countries such as Sudan and 
Afghanistan. This claim has made the opposition feeling superiority and arrogance. Some of them do not accept and 
cannot imagine that MB figure is the ruler of Egypt. They want, like the former regime, from MB members to be 
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followers not rulers. They get used to see them in the prison, not in the governmental offices (Al-Qudaimy, 2008). 
     A lot of the opposition leaders have personal aspirations since some of them failed in the presidential contest. One 
of them, Hamdain Sabahi, got more than 4.8 million votes. They think that the Egyptian people did not choose Mursi 
because he is the best. They chose him because they did not want to vote to the old regime candidate, Ahmad Shafiq. 
The revolutionaries had no choice except Mursi since the runoff was between two only, Mursi and Shafiq. This belief 
made some of the opposition leaders think that if president Mursi failed and an early election held they would win. As 
Sharif Al-kharashi believes; the desire to be the president was the hope of some of the opposition leaders.   
      Despite of the large number of the members of NSF (35 groups), they have a very weak attendance in the political 
developments. Their influence in the political scene is also weak. Their alliance is not as strong as they desire, and 
has a lot of disagreements. They could not force president Mursi to respond to any of their political demands such as 
rewriting the constitution or changing the parliamentary elections date. They have not been a real challenge for FJP 
rule. This weakness has made them worried that FJP will perform like the former ruling party NDP. They think that 
the MB Islamic political culture and the great number of the members of MB will lead FJP to be the new version of 
NDP. Since then, the term of Ikhwanization (Brotherhoodization) has appeared. 
2.4. The Role of the Deep State 
     The fact that the 25 January Uprising was civil has helped the remnants of the old regime to maintain their positions 
and interests. The uprising has not totally dismantled the structure of the old regime because the Egypt’s 
revolutionaries were eager to preserve the state institutions as a national property. Only, the leadership of the old 
regime was displaced; the rest of the regime has stayed in their positions with all responsibilities. The Egyptian 
politicians and experts have called the former regime institutions and officials as the ‘Deep State’. 
     Decades of governance helped the NDP cadres and members to penetrate in all the institutions and positions of the 
state. Most of the senior officers in the ministries, presidential institutions, the judiciary, and the security agencies 
were members in the dissolved NDP. The uprising did not change their loyalty and their political ideology. They may 
have loyalty to Egypt, but surely they will not be loyal to MB and its program. They will not be part of president 
Mursi renaissance program and they will not help MB and FJP to take control of Egypt. MB has been an opponent for 
the Deep State. It used to work against them everywhere and every time (Tadros, 2012). 
     The security services, which are the most important part of the Deep State, especially the internal security services 
had never been with the Egyptian people, in particular MB members. Since 1940s, the security services have treated 
MB as an enemy and as agents for foreign powers. They have been educated that MB and its members are the main 
threat for the country, the state and the national security. The former regimes accused MB and its members with all 
the evils that the Egyptian had known. It is very difficult to change the mindset of these services in short period. By 
time, their viewpoint toward MB may change (Abd Al-Majad, 1991). 
     The other main aspect of the Deep State is the corruption. The corruption was very common in Mubarak’s Egypt. 
The leaders and many of the officers were corrupted. Any step toward the reform and accountability would be a real 
threat to their interests in different official positions. They might be sent to prisons due to their behaviors during 
Mubarak’s era. Hence, they have been doing their best to deactivate the transition in Egypt (Phillips, 2009). 
     The media has had a very influential role in Egypt after January Uprising. Great shift in freedom of media happened 
after the 25 January uprising. During Mubarak’s era the media was not free. The security hegemony affected freedom 
of media like many other aspects of the Egyptian life. No one could appear on the TV and criticize Mubarak or his 
regime, and those who did so faced different kinds of troubles in their life by the regime. The political parties, in 
particular, the opposition parties, among them MB, never had the chance to set up their own media such as a satellite 
channel. 
     The uprising opened the door widely for journalists and politicians to express their opinions in everything. Many 
new satellite channels were opened, and many new journalists and political analysts appeared.  It is normal to criticize 
the authority. The first time in Egypt’s history that everyone, even the president, can be criticized. Every official 
policy, stance or statement can be analyzed, criticized, rejected and attacked by any journalist or politician. The 
president himself becomes one of the main issues that discussed daily. A real freedom of media and expression started 
in FJP’s Egypt. 
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     Nevertheless, the division in the political scene in post- 2011 uprising Egypt has affected the media. The media 
has divided sharply between the proponents and the opposition of the new regime. Tough media campaigns have 
started between the two parts. Different kind of accusations and a lot of defamation, curser and lack of respect have 
appeared though the Egyptian TV channels and news papers. They have displayed a very bad, horrible, and pessimistic 
view for Egypt. Watching the Egypt TV channels made audiences think that within few months the country will 
witness sectarian war, collapse of the economy and bankruptcy, civil war, hungry uprising and so on. Such media is 
owned by figures of the former regime and supported by foreign powers as FJP believe. 
2.5. Muslim Brotherhood problematic political Mindset and Performance 
     The political mentality of MB was one of the obstacles in front of the democratic transition. The formation of this 
mentality was first influenced by abnormal circumstances of oppression, torture, exclusion, and enforced exile under 
tyranny regimes paving the way to build quite inflexible political mindset. These factors, in addition to the intensive 
ideological education that focus on the extraordinary role of MB as an Islamic movement in rebuilding the Egyptian 
people and society according to the Islamic principles, have shaped the MB political mentality. This political mentality 
depends only on its party cadres, do not trust the others, suspect in everything and strongly believe in conspiracy 
(Sa‘id, 2008). 
      President Mursi and his party FJP did not pay attention to the complications that faced Egypt after a long autocracy 
governance that requires wide national coalition from the revolutionary parties, in particular those who supported 
them in the presidential elections. They took the responsibility alone, only two of the Islamic parties, from tens of the 
Egyptian parties, shared them. This helped in founding a wide national opposition coalition.  
     In view of the fact that MB and FJP wanted to completely implement their project, they would not be able to build 
any coalitions. Any coalition should depend on the common issues between the two parties, the opposition and the 
ruling party. It is very difficult for MB and FJP to build any coalition if they want to implement their program 
completely. Although they have their own project that helps them to achieve their strategic goals, they should take 
into account the crucial time that Egypt lives and serves the interests of the country on their own interests as Sharif 
Al-Kharashi said. 
     MB and FJP believed that the ruling Egypt was a historical opportunity that should not be lost. They should do 
their best to achieve their goals and carry out their program. This is their right that democracy secures since they are 
the majority. This perspective made MB and FJP accelerate to achieve their program. The enthusiasm to invest the 
historical moment might made them not wisely considered the importance of the collective working and the 
cooperation with other parties, particularly in this time. In a short time after the uprising MB and FJP managed to have 
a large number of opponents in Egypt, even from those who was their revolutionary partners. They lost a large number 
of friends. Together their policy and the constant planning against them by their opponents led to various troubles to 
their country and finally to a military coup in July 3, 2013 (Masetti et al., 2013). 
     In addition to the political mindset, MB and FJP suffered from the lack of political and ruling experience. Under 
non-democratic regime, it is very difficult to find experienced political parties. As noted earlier Mubrak’s ruling party 
was the only one that had full support and chance to work and develop his abilities in Egypt, while MB and many 
other parties were not allowed practice real political work, except the limit role in some parliament’s sessions. They 
were busy with thinking how to avoid the security measures against them. They did not have the time and the space 
to develop their abilities (Tadros, 2012). 
          The situation became more difficult when they chose a person who lacked the necessary charisma for the 
presidency. Since the first day of his candidacy Muhammad Mursi has appeared as a weak president. MB announced 
that Khairat al-Shatir, the strong man in the GGO, would be its first candidate and Muhammad Mursi would be the 
second since al-Shatir had a legal problem that might lead to cancel his nomination. Therefore, his party weakened 
his position before the opposition did so. The Egyptian media and the opposition have benefited from this point in 
their attack on Mursi, even after he became the president.  
     As a president, Mursi did not appear strong and confirmed in his performance. He had not been able to act as a 
revolutionary leader. He had been seen as a double-minded, and not confident in his decisions. He had taken decisions 
and changed them or could not apply them because of the rejection of the opposition or the judiciary power. The lack 
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of experience, the weakness and the lack of knowledge of his consultants, the direct interference of the MB leadership 
in the presidential decisions and the great desire of change have led to many mistakes. These mistakes harmed the 
image of the president before his people and led to the resignation of most of his team, in particular those who are not 
MB members. 
3. Conclusion 
     The long way of MB political struggle has enabled them to be the main political party in Egypt. Their political arm 
(FJP) was the ruling party for the first time in the history. All the measures taken against them failed. The majority of 
Egyptian people are still supporting them. The leaders, cadres and members of MB and FJP have great desire and 
hope to lead Egypt toward development, stability, democracy and leadership of the Islamic world. 
     FJP which was leading Egypt at a historical moment is a democratic party with Islamic identity. This party is in 
the way to create its own style of democracy that combines between the fundamental principles of democracy and the 
Islamic values. The other secular and leftist parties are not influential, and do not have the ability to lead democratic 
transition in Egypt. The heavy legacy left behind Mubarak’s regime, and the great challenges or obstacles on the way 
of democratic change, among them the military coup; need a strong leading political party that has experts, cadres and 
members with vast popularity like the FJP. The military coup will delay the democratic transition but it will not put 
an end to the process. 
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